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Detained children routinely appear before Michigan’s juvenile courts 
shackled with handcuffs, leg irons, and belly chains.1 Once security officers 
bring a child to court in these shackles, the child usually remains in them for 
her hearing or trial. In Michigan, as in many other states, no statute or court 
rule requires the judge to decide whether shackles are necessary.2 
This Essay argues that Michigan should pass legislation or amend state 
court rules to create a presumption against shackling children. Unless a child 
poses a substantial risk of flight or physical danger and less restrictive 
alternatives to shackling will not adequately address those risks, the child 
should appear in court without shackles. 
 
 * J.D., August 2014, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to Frank Vandervort, 
Kim Thomas, Eve Brensike Primus, Alec Karakatsanis, James MacLeod, Eva Foti, and Guy 
Newland for inspiration and helpful comments. Thanks also to David Shapiro and my editors, 
Matthew McCurdy and Brian Tengel. I dedicate this Essay to my mother, the late Dr. Valerie 
Stephens, who overcame a childhood of poverty and abuse and devoted her life to helping 
others do the same. 
 1. I frequently saw shackled children in Washtenaw County Trial Court when I was a 
student attorney in the University of Michigan Law School’s Juvenile Justice Clinic. Local 
attorneys confirm routine child shackling across the state. Email from Frank Vandervort, 
Clinical Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., to Gabe Newland (May 15, 2014, 12:26 PM) 
(on file with author) (Genesee County); Email from Nichole Smithson, Attorney, N.L. 
Smithson & Assocs. PLLC, to Frank Vandervort (Apr. 9, 2014, 8:42 PM) (on file with author) 
(Oakland County); Email from Susan Murphy, Referee, Jackson Cnty. Family Court, to Frank 
Vandervort (Apr. 10, 2014, 8:22 AM) (on file with author) (Jackson County); Email from Eric 
Scott, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Sanilac Cnty., to Frank Vandervort (Apr. 10, 2014, 9:11 
AM) (on file with author) (Sanilac County).  
 2. Kim M. McLaurin, Children in Chains: Indiscriminate Shackling of Juveniles, 38 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 213, 232 n.119 (2012) (explaining that “no judicial decision, written 
procedural rule, written court policy, or legislation” prohibits indiscriminate shackling in 
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, or the District 
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There are many good reasons to adopt such a presumption. First, 
Michigan’s current practice serves little purpose: judges can keep 
courtrooms safe without indiscriminate shackling. Second, shackles flout the 
rehabilitative goals of juvenile court by humiliating and traumatizing 
children. Third, shackles cause constitutional harm. They interfere with 
attorney–client communications, offend the dignity of the judicial process, 
and erode the presumption of innocence, thus undermining the Fifth, Sixth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Finally, not 
a single state legislature or appellate court has endorsed indiscriminate child 
shackling, and a growing number of states reject the practice. 
I. COURTROOM SECURITY 
Some support indiscriminate child shackling by arguing that it is 
necessary “to ensure that security is maintained in the courtroom.”3 And 
given the high tension and potential for violence in courtrooms across the 
country,4 security is indeed an important concern. But indiscriminate child 
shackling does not obviously improve courtroom security; both logic and 
experience suggest that courtrooms would remain safe with a presumption 
against shackling. 
First, a presumption is not a blanket ban. It simply changes the default, 
asking the judge to articulate a reason for shackling. Does the child’s 
behavior create a substantial risk of flight? Does her behavior create a 
substantial risk of physical danger? And, crucially, will the presence of 
bailiffs or other courtroom employees address those risks? If not, the judge 
may shackle. 
Second, juvenile courts outside Michigan have adopted similar rules 
without experiencing spikes in courtroom violence. In Miami–Dade County, 
for example, “more than 20,000 detained children have appeared before the 
court unbound” since 2006, when the county adopted a presumption against 
shackling.5 Once during that time, a boy “started for the exit of the 
courtroom” before a public defender stopped him.6 And yet “no child has 
 
 3. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 26 So. 3d 552, 559 
(Fla. 2009) (Canady, J., dissenting). 
 4. See, e.g., Jack Healy, Defendant Killed by Court Officer at Utah Trial, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 22, 2014, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/us/defendant-killed-
by-court-officer-at-utah-trial.html.  
 5. CARLOS J. MARTINEZ, LAW OFFICES OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER, 11TH JUDICIAL 
CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, UNCHAIN THE CHILDREN: FIVE YEARS LATER IN FLORIDA 1 (2011), 
available at 
http://www.pdmiami.com/unchainthechildren/Shackling_Update_December_2011.pdf.  
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harmed anyone or escaped from court.”7 On the other side of the country, a 
pilot program to reduce shackling in Nevada’s most populous county reveals 
similar results. “[T]here has not been an increase in courtroom violence,” 
confirmed Brigid Duffy, Clark County’s chief juvenile prosecutor.8 Duffy  
explained that, after two years, the program has satisfied “office concerns for 
the safety of victims, witnesses and prosecutors;” she plans to work with 
other county agencies “to develop a more formalized policy and procedure.”9 
East of Nevada, Boulder provides yet another example. The Colorado county 
has “not had any problems” since adopting a presumption against shackling 
earlier this year.10 According to chief juvenile prosecutor Peggy Jessel, 
Boulder has “not deemed anyone to need the restraints,” and there have been 
“no incidents in the courtroom.”11 
II. THE REHABILITATIVE PURPOSE OF JUVENILE COURTS 
More than forty years ago, in Kent v. United States, the Supreme Court 
explained that juvenile courts are supposed “to provide measures of 
guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for society, not to fix 
criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment.”12 In the years since Kent, the 
developmental differences between children and adults have continued to 
shape our legal system. J.D.B. v. North Carolina held that age matters when 
determining whether a child is in “custody” according to Miranda v. 
Arizona;13 Roper v. Simmons banned the death penalty for children under 
eighteen;14 Graham v. Florida prohibited life-without-parole sentences for 
children under eighteen convicted of nonhomicide offenses;15 and Miller v. 
Alabama “combined” Roper and Graham to prohibit mandatory life-
without-parole sentences for children under eighteen.16 The rationale 
guiding these holdings—children’s relative lack of maturity, limited ability to 
consider the consequences of their actions, and increased capacity to reform 
their behavior—provides the foundation for juvenile justice. 
 
 7. Id. at 1.  
 8. Email from Brigid Duffy, Chief Deputy Dist. Attorney, Juvenile Div., Clark Cnty. 
Dist. Attorney’s Office, to Gabe Newland (July 15, 2014, 3:14 PM) (on file with author). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Email from Lisa A. Polansky, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, to Gabe Newland 
(Mar. 13, 2014, 6:02 PM) (on file with author).  
 11. Email from Peggy Jessel, Chief Deputy Dist. Attorney, 20th Judicial Dist. Juvenile 
Div., to Gabe Newland (June 27, 2014, 12:08 PM) (on file with author).  
 12. 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).  
 13. 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2398–99 (2011).  
 14. 543 U.S. 551, 575, 578–79 (2005), rev’g Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).  
 15. 560 U.S. 48, 81–82 (2010).  
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The statute that establishes Michigan’s juvenile justice system echoes 
Kent. It focuses on the “care” and “guidance” of “each juvenile coming 
within the court’s jurisdiction.”17 Under the statute, hearings and trials in 
juvenile court “are not criminal proceedings;”18 when “a juvenile is removed 
from the control of his or her parents, the juvenile shall be placed in care as 
nearly as possible equivalent to the care that should have been given to the 
juvenile by his or her parents.”19 Consistent with the rehabilitative language 
defining juvenile justice in Michigan, juvenile courts typically strive to 
“protect children” and “increase the competencies of court-involved 
youth.”20 
And yet shackles work against these rehabilitative goals. They humiliate 
and traumatize kids. Dr. Marty Beyer, a psychologist and nationally 
renowned adolescent-development expert, submitted an affidavit to Florida 
courts during the state’s successful shackling reform. According to Dr. Beyer, 
shackles are “physically painful” and “humiliating.”21 Because children are 
“[i]n the midst of their identity and moral development,”22 shackles “may 
solidify adolescents’ alienation, send mixed messages about the purpose of 
the justice system, and confirm their belief that they are bad.”23 
“Children and adolescents,” Dr. Beyer explained, “are more vulnerable 
to lasting harm from feeling humiliation and shame than adults.”24 Children 
lack the cognitive and emotional maturity to recognize the difference 
between a blanket shackling policy and personal punishment.25 And because 
children are relatively immature, “their reaction to the unfairness of being 
shackled may preoccupy them, interfering with their paying attention to 
what the judge says in the courtroom.”26 Shackles are particularly harmful to 
 
 17. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.1(3) (West 2012).  
 18. Id. § 712A.1(2).  
 19. Id. § 712A.1(3).  
 20. E.g., Mission & Vision Statements, Washtenaw County Trial Court, Juvenile Court, 
http://washtenawtrialcourt.org/juvenile (last visited June 29, 2014).  
 21. Aff. of Dr. Marty Beyer ¶¶ 10, 20, In re R.C., No. 2006-CJ-004506 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 
23, 2006), available at http://www.pdmiami.com/unchainthechildren/AppendixDBeyer.pdf. 
 22. Id. ¶ 17. 
 23. Id. According to one child, “I was so worried about how everyone was seeing me in 
shackles that I couldn’t concentrate because it made me feel like a monster. I felt unfairly 
treated. I was unable to focus.” Letter from Christian Ordonez-Henderson to Justice Charles 
Johnson, Chair, Wash. State Supreme Court Rules Comm. (Apr. 30, 2014), available at 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_Rules/proposed/2014Feb/JuCR1.6/Christian%20Ordonez-
Henderson.pdf.  
 24. Aff. of Dr. Marty Beyer, supra note 21, ¶ 10.  
 25. Id. ¶ 14.  
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children of color, who may experience this public degradation as racism, 
“which is extremely harmful to the development of a positive identity.”27 
Many children in juvenile court “have experienced severe trauma, 
including the death of family members, physical and sexual abuse, exposure 
to domestic and street violence, and school failure due to learning 
disabilities.”28 According to Dr. Beyer, shackles can delay recovery and 
retraumatize children by causing them to “feel once again that they cannot 
control hurtful things that happen to them.”29 Shackles may also “provoke in 
a traumatized young person a combination of self-blame and sense of 
betrayal that can lead to self-destructiveness or aggression.”30 
Given these harmful consequences, Dr. Beyer concluded that “[p]hysical 
restraints should not be a routine practice with children and adolescents.”31 
Instead, shackles “should be limited to rare situations when a young person 
poses an imminent threat to others’ safety.”32 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Shackles undermine the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments 
because they interfere with attorney–client communications, offend the 
dignity of the judicial process, and erode the presumption of innocence. 
“[L]iberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the core 
of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause . . . .”33 In Deck v. 
Missouri, the Supreme Court held that due process “does not permit the use 
of visible restraints if the trial court has not taken account of the 
circumstances of the particular case.”34 Before shackling a defendant during 
“the guilt phase of a criminal trial”35 or during “penalty proceedings in 
capital cases,”36 the trial court must first determine whether shackles “are 
 
 27. Id. ¶ 12.  
 28. Id. ¶ 18. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. ¶ 7.  
 32. Id. 
 33. Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982) (quoting Greenholtz v. Neb. Penal 
Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); see also 
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (“[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights 
is for adults alone.”).  
 34. 544 U.S. 622, 632 (2005); accord People v. Dunn, 521 N.W.2d 255, 262 (Mich. 1994) 
(“[A] defendant may be shackled only on a finding supported by record evidence that this is 
necessary to prevent escape, injury to persons in the courtroom or to maintain order.”).  
 35. Deck, 544 U.S. at 632. 
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justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial.”37 In Deck, a jury 
convicted Carman Deck of capital murder for robbing and killing an elderly 
couple, but the Court held that Deck’s conviction was not enough to justify 
shackles during the penalty phase.38 The trial judge did not consider the “risk 
of escape,”39 the Court explained, nor did he adequately consider whether 
Deck posed “a threat to courtroom security.”40 
Although Deck did not decide whether the Constitution prohibits 
indiscriminate shackling outside the presence of a jury, the Court’s rationale 
suggests that it does. The negative effects of shackling on “three fundamental 
legal principles”—the right to counsel, the dignity of the judicial process, and 
the presumption of innocence—motivated the Court’s conclusion that due 
process prohibits indiscriminate shackling during the guilt phase.41 When a 
judge begins a child’s hearing or trial without first considering whether 
shackles are necessary, she offends each of these fundamental legal 
principles—jurors or no jurors. 
First, shackling “diminishes” the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.42 It “interfere[s] with [his] ability to participate in his own 
defense . . . by freely choosing whether to take the witness stand.”43 
Furthermore, “[s]hackles can interfere with the accused’s ability to 
communicate with his lawyer.”44 Neither of these concerns evaporates when 
jurors leave the courtroom.45 Children often need to testify at bench trials 
and pretrial hearings, and they always need to communicate with counsel. 
Indeed, children often have a greater need than adults to communicate 
 
 37. Id. at 629.  
 38. Id. at 624, 634.  
 39. Id. at 634. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. at 630–32.  
 42. Id. at 631.  
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). According to one child, “[t]alking to my 
attorney shackled was a hassle because it was hard for me to sign papers with waist chains and 
cuffs. It was a distraction because I was nervous and was tapping my foot the whole time. 
When speaking with my attorney I didn’t feel trusted.” Letter from Colin Castenada to Justice 
Charles Johnson, Chair, Wash. State Supreme Court Rules Comm. (Apr. 30, 2014), available at 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_Rules/proposed/2014Feb/JuCR1.6/Colin%20Castenada.pdf. 
 45. E.g., United States v. Durham, 287 F.3d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Even if the 
physical restraints placed upon the defendant are not visible to the jury, they still may burden 
several aspects of a defendant’s right to a fair trial.”); id. (“[L]eg shackles ‘may confuse the 
defendant, impair his ability to confer with counsel, and significantly affect the trial strategy he 
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effectively with counsel because children are less mature and therefore less 
likely to understand the complicated events unfolding before them.46 
Second, shackles offend the dignity of the judicial process.47 That dignity 
“includes the respectful treatment of defendants, reflects the importance of 
the matter at issue . . . and the gravity with which Americans consider any 
deprivation of an individual’s liberty through criminal punishment.”48 
According to the Supreme Court, “[t]he routine use of shackles in the 
presence of juries would undermine these symbolic yet concrete 
objectives.”49 But the danger that shackles will “have a significant effect on 
the jury’s feelings about the defendant” is not the only problem.50 As the 
Court explained in Illinois v. Allen, “the use of this technique is itself 
something of an affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial 
proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold.”51 
Finally, “[v]isible shackling undermines the presumption of innocence 
and the related fairness of the factfinding process.”52 It is “inherently 
prejudicial.”53 As the Michigan Supreme Court explained in People v. Dunn, 
“[t]he presumption of innocence requires the garb of innocence.”54 And 
because the presumption of innocence does not vanish when jurors leave the 
courtroom, the prejudice lingers. Witnesses, probation officers, and judges 
are human. Like jurors, they have strong subconscious biases.55 In the same 
way that shackles affect jurors, shackles subtly influence juvenile court 
judges. Is there probable cause?56 Should a child remain detained pending 
trial?57 Did the child commit the offense alleged in the petition?58 If so, how 
 
 46. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010).  
 47. Deck, 544 U.S at 631. 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. 
 50. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970). 
 51. Id. (emphasis added). 
 52. Deck, 544 U.S. at 628. According to one child, “I felt that I was already convicted as 
guilty in my case because appearing in shackles in court I got degrading looks from other 
people in court. I also feel that judge thought of me as a troubled teenager because I was in 
shackles.” Letter from Colin Castenada to Justice Charles Johnson, supra note 44. 
 53. Deck, 544 U.S. at 630 (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568 (1986)).  
 54. 521 N.W.2d 255, 262 n.26 (Mich. 1994) (alterations in original) (quoting Eaddy v. 
People, 174 P.2d 717, 718 (Colo. 1946)).  
 55. See generally Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Kreiger, Implicit Bias: 
Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 956–61 (2006) (explaining implicit bias and 
describing the “substantial” evidence “that implicit attitudes produce discriminatory 
behavior”).  
 56. MICH. CT. R. 3.935(D)(1) (2008). 
 57. MICH. CT. R. 3.935(C)–(D).  
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should adjudication affect the child’s liberty?59 Shackles influence a judge’s 
decision about each of these important questions. Although judges may be 
less vulnerable than juries to the prejudicial effect of shackles, judges also 
exhibit subconscious biases that affect their decisions.60 
IV. THE NATIONWIDE TREND 
Not a single legislature or appellate court has endorsed indiscriminate 
child shackling, and more than a dozen states reject the practice. In other 
states, like Colorado61 and Nevada,62 judges in multiple county trial courts 
prohibit indiscriminate shackling despite the absence of a statewide rule. In 
every state where indiscriminate shackling remains, it remains because of 
inertia, not reason or necessity. 
The trend away from child shackling began with In re Staley.63 The 
Illinois Supreme Court held that, unless the record “established clearly” that 
a child “may try to escape” or “pose a threat to the safety of people in the 
courtroom” or that shackles were “necessary to maintain order during the 
trial,” a child “cannot be tried in shackles whether there is to be a bench trial 
or a trial by jury.”64 Poor courtroom security did not justify handcuffs.65 
Several years after this Illinois decision, an appellate court in Oregon 
rejected indiscriminate child shackling.66 More recently, appellate courts in 
California,67 Florida,68 North Dakota,69 and Washington70 joined the chorus. 
 
 59. MICH. CT. R. 3.943.  
 60. Cf. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009) (confirming that judges harbor implicit racial biases).  
 61. Boulder County Eliminates the Practice of Indiscriminate Shackling of Juveniles 
During Court Proceedings, BOULDER CNTY. (Mar. 20, 2014), 
http://www.bouldercounty.org/apps/newsroom/templates/bc12.aspx?articleid=3975&zoneid=
1. Boulder is the second county in Colorado to eliminate indiscriminate child shackling. CTR. 
FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, PROHIBITION OF INDISCRIMINATE SHACKLING IN COLORADO JUVENILE 
COURTS 2–3, available at 
http://www.centerforjuvenilejustice.org/images/Shackling_Factsheet_CJJ_.pdf.  
 62. Colleen McCarty, I-Team: Shackles Coming Off Juveniles in Court, 8NEWSNOW.COM 
(Nov. 1, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://www.8newsnow.com/story/19979410/i-team-shackles-coming-
off-juveniles-in-court (reporting that Clark County, Nevada, which is in the process of ending 
indiscriminate child shackling, is the only county in Nevada that “still chains its children”). 
 63. 364 N.E.2d 72, 73–74 (Ill. 1977).  
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. at 74.  
 66. State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Multnomah Cnty. v. Millican, 906 P.2d 857, 860 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1995).  
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In Florida, for example, the highest court approved a statewide court rule 
creating a presumption against shackling children; the court described 
shackles as “repugnant, degrading, humiliating, and contrary to the stated 
primary purposes of the juvenile justice system.”71 The Miami Herald 
praised the court for making “the right call in ending this humiliating 
practice.”72 
In North Carolina, where the state legislature created a presumption 
against shackling, “the judge may subject a juvenile to physical restraint in 
the courtroom only when the judge finds the restraint to be reasonably 
necessary to maintain order, prevent the juvenile’s escape, or provide for the 
safety of the courtroom.”73 Connecticut’s judiciary adopted a similar 
presumption,74 and in New York the State Office of Children and Family 
Services “prohibits the use of shackles during the transportation of any youth 
in state custody—including those held at secure facilities, most of whom 
have committed more serious crimes—to and from court appearances.”75 
In the last four years, Massachusetts,76 New Mexico,77 and 
Pennsylvania78 amended court rules to create a presumption against 
shackling. In Pennsylvania, for example, the Supreme Court adopted Rule 
139, which requires courts to remove shackles unless a judge first determines 
 
 68. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 26 So. 3d 552, 556–57 
(Fla. 2009). 
 69. In re R.W.S., 728 N.W.2d 326, 331 (N.D. 2007). 
 70. State v. E.J.Y., 55 P.3d 673, 679 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). 
 71. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 26 So. 3d at 556.  
 72. Editorial, Court Made Right Call in Limiting Juvenile Shackles, THE MIAMI HERALD, 
Dec. 28, 2009, at A14.  
 73. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-2402.1 (LexisNexis 2014).  
 74. Judiciary Comm. Public Hearing, House Bill 7406, An Act Concerning Youthful 
Offenders, Delinquent Children and Drug-Free Zones (Conn. 2007) (testimony of Judge 
William J. Lavery, Chief Court Administrator for the Connecticut Judicial Branch), available at 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/JUDdata/Tmy/2007HB-07406-R000404-
CT%20Judicial%20Branch,%20Judge%20William%20J.%20Lavery-TMY.PDF (“On March 15, 
2007 the Judicial Branch instituted a new shackling policy for juveniles, which is consistent 
with emerging state and federal law around the country to allow juveniles to attend court 
unshackled whenever possible . . . .”). According to the Director of Delinquency Defense and 
Child Protection at Connecticut’s Office of the Chief Public Defender, however, the policy still 
“results in most kids being shackled in court.” Email from Christine Perra Rapillo to Gabe 
Newland (June 27, 2014, 2:18 PM) (on file with author). 
 75. Nicholas Confessore, Officials Bar Shackling of Juvenile Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
4, 2010, at A28 (citing internal memorandum from the New York Office of Children and 
Family Services), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/04/nyregion/04juvenile.html. 
 76. TRIAL CT. OF THE COMMONWEALTH, CT. OFFICER POLICY AND PROCEDURES 
MANUAL, Ch. 4, § VI (2010).  
 77. N.M CHILDREN’S CT. 10-223A(B) (2014). 
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that they are necessary to prevent physical harm, disruptive courtroom 
behavior, or flight.79 Pennsylvania later passed nearly identical legislation.80 
Finally, South Carolina81 and Washington82 each adopted a robust 
presumption against shackling earlier this year. Republican State Senator 
Michael Fair introduced the legislation creating South Carolina’s 
presumption, which the Republican-controlled General Assembly passed 
unanimously and the Republican Governor Nikki Haley signed into law.83 
Like Washington’s new court rule, the South Carolina law presents the 
juvenile judge with two questions: (1) Is “the use of restraints necessary,” 
perhaps because “the juvenile poses a threat of serious harm to himself or 
others”?84 (2) Will “less restrictive alternatives,” like the presence of “court 
personnel” or “bailiffs,” obviate the need for shackles?85 Although some 
states do not ask the second question,86 posing both questions creates a 
stronger rule that better protects children. 
CONCLUSION 
Michigan should follow South Carolina and the growing number of 
states that have passed legislation or amended court rules to create a 
presumption against shackling children. Unless a child poses a substantial 
risk of flight or physical danger and less restrictive alternatives to shackling 
will not adequately address those risks, the child should appear in court 
without shackles. Such a policy would keep courtrooms safe, avoid 
constitutional problems, and advance the rehabilitative goals of juvenile 
court. 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6336.2 (West 2013).  
 81. S.C. Act 186, 120th session (2014) (to be codified at S.C. CODE § 63-19-1435(A)(2)). 
 82. Order in the Matter of the Adoption of Amendments to JuCR 1.6, No. 25700-A-
1067 (Wash. 2014), available at 
http://www.defensenet.org/news/WA%20Supreme%20Court%20Order%20re%20Juvenile%20
Shackling%20-%2025700-A-1067.pdf. 
 83. A186, R209, S440 Status Information, SOUTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY (June 
10, 2014, 1:01 PM), http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess120_2013-2014/bills/440.htm. 
 84. S.C. Act 186, 120th session (2014) (to be codified at S.C. CODE § 63-19-1435(A)(2)). 
 85. Id.  
 86. E.g., PA. R. JUVENILE CRIM. P. 139, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (West 2013) 
(Pennsylvania); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-2402.1 (LexisNexis 2014) (North Carolina); TRIAL 
CT. OF THE COMMONWEALTH, CT. OFFICER POLICY AND PROCEDURES MANUAL, Ch. 4, § VI 
(2010) (Massachusetts); N.M CHILDREN’S CT. 10-223A(B) (2014) (New Mexico).  
